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The aim of this paper is to suggest a new interpretation to the Gettier 
problem by showing that the standard JTB defi nition of knowledge is 
not epistemologically incomplete, being at the same time formally incom-
plete. The Gettier problem is shown to emerge through the implicit self-
application of the JTB defi nition of knowledge to prove its own incom-
pleteness. A conclusion is drawn, which runs counter to the traditional 
view that the problem necessarily requires a conceptual amendment of 
the standard defi nition, in spite of the formal incompleteness of the lat-
ter. The Gettier problem is construed to be related to the ancient Meno 
problem within a contemporary justifi cational discourse.
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1. Preliminary Remarks
The standard defi nition of knowledge was inspired by Plato’s dialogues 
Theaetetus, The Republic, and mostly by Meno. To Meno’s question 
“Why knowledge should be so much more prized than right opinion, 
and indeed how there is any difference between them” (Meno 97 d), 
Socrates explains his answer using a dialectical metaphor. It is based 
on the legendary masterhood of Daedalus to create statues in so perfect 
a manner that, if not tethered, they run away and escape:
Socrates: …And that, I may say, has a bearing on the matter of true opin-
ions. True opinions are a fi ne thing and do all sorts of good so long as they 
stay in their place, but they will not stay long. They run away from a man’s 
mind; so they are not worth much until you tether them by working out the 
reason. (Meno 97e–98a)
The last metaphor of “tethering”, or “working out the reason” of a true 
opinion (alēthēs dóxa), and thus turning it into knowledge (epistēmē), 
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was further elucidated by Socrates through his well known theory of 
recollection. Philosophers, who do not accept the literal message of Pla-
to’s epistemological view, have elaborated his approach, to reach the 
tacit agreement that knowledge is justifi ed true belief (JTB). And this 
standard JTB defi nition has seemed to be unproblematically indorsed 
(at least by analytic philosophers) until the beginning of the 60ies of 
the twentieth century.
Then in 1963 on the epistemological scene appeared Edmund Get-
tier. In a short, three pages article, he managed to destroy the plausi-
bility of the accepted standard defi nition (Gettier 1963). He succeeded 
in so doing, by adducing two clear cases, showing that one could have 
some true belief that is also justifi ed, and yet not have knowledge. So 
the claim has been raised that JTB is probably necessary, but not a suf-
fi cient condition for having knowledge, and that a better defi nition of 
knowledge must be discovered. Thus the notorious Gettier problem was 
born, and since then has not obtained a commonly accepted solution; 
or, as Robert Shope puts it:
In spite of the vast literature that Gettier’s brief paper elicited, there is 
still no widespread agreement as to whether the Gettier problem has been 
solved, nor as to what constitutes the most promising line of research. 
(Shope 1998: 54)
A decade, or so, after this remark by R. Shope, “the literature on 
Gettier’s brief paper” has rapidly enhanced. The standard strategy of 
searching for a defi nition of knowledge stronger than JTB, so that it 
could stay outside the pincers of the Gettier problem, has not resulted, 
however, in forging such a defi nition of knowledge to be generally ac-
cepted, or at least as tacitly accepted as JTB has been till 1963.
The aim of this paper is to suggest a new interpretation to the Get-
tier problem, by showing that its genesis lies in the implicit application 
of the JTB defi nition to gain its own incompleteness.
The Gettier problem, however, still persists in the renovated con-
ceptual garments of the Meno problem about “tethering” mere true 
beliefs to be turned into knowledge. These garments bear the label of 
justifi cation. So, it is the idea of justifi cation that needs to be placed in 
the centre of a broader and deeper analysed.
2. A New Look at the Gettier Problem
After the publication of Gettier’s paper, a good deal of Gettier-like 
counter-examples to the standard (JTB) defi nition of knowledge was 
suggested. Since they all have a common anti-luck-and-luck scenario, 
I’ll prefer to turn back to the fi rst original case, presented by Gettier 
himself.
Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose 
that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition:
d. Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his 
pocket.
 A. S. Stefanov, Is The Standard Defi nition of Knowledge Incomplete? 109
Smith’s evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company as-
sured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had 
counted the coins in Jones’s pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails:
e. The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts 
(e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, 
Smith is clearly justifi ed in believing that (e) is true.
But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get 
the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. 
Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith in-
ferred (e), is false. In our example, then, all of the following are true: (i) (e) 
is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and (iii) Smith is justifi ed in be-
lieving that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that 
(e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith’s pocket, 
while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith’s pocket, and bases 
his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones’s pocket, whom he falsely 
believes to be the man who will get the job (Gettier 1963: 121–2).
The key claim from the cited case above certainly is
 (K) “Smith does not know that (e) is true”.
Now let us pose the question: “Who is the knower of (K)?” The direct 
answer is that the knower is the teller of the story; let us accept that 
this is E. Gettier himself. But how he came to know that (K)?
This is a crucial question, because, if this claim were not true, then 
Gettier would not fulfi l his task to show that JTB account of knowledge 
fails.
Of course, as a counterexample to a claimed theory of knowledge, it 
doesn’t actually seem to matter whether anyone knows that the coun-
terexample exists, or not. So, one could contend that Gettier is not sup-
posed to prove that he knows that K. It is Smith who doesn’t know that 
he himself will get the job, and that he has ten coins in his pocket, but 
nevertheless believes that (e) is true. Thus it seems that the knowledge 
of (K) is not related to the demonstration of the incompleteness of the 
JTB defi nition of knowledge.
However, it is the very defi nition of knowledge that is at stake here. 
To this effect Gettier (the teller of the story) must be certain of what 
he would like to convince us. It is no doubt that an instrument for ana-
lysing knowledge (all the more its defi nition) has to be of a cognitive 
nature; that is to say, it must not be less than knowledge, for instance a 
mere opinion, or a fabricated story, staying outside of some real cogni-
tive context. Hence Gettier simply has to know that (K). But in order 
for him to be a knowing agent – in this case a meta-knowing agent – he 
himself must be involved in a real cognitive situation, and not to be an 
inventive contriver of the adduced story.
So, how Gettier may really have knowledge that (K)?
The answer to this question would mean elucidating the fact that he 
has a meta-knowledge in comparison to Smith, who does not know that 
(e) is true. To this effect Gettier must be involved in a genuine situation 
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of knowledge acquisition.
Suppose that Gettier may “have strong evidence” that Jones has ten 
coins in his pocket, since he was a secret eye-witness when Smith was 
counting them “ten minutes ago”. He then is certain that Smith knows 
that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Let us further suppose that he 
managed to count the coins in Smith’s pocket as well (when Smith was 
buying a cup of coffee at the near counter, for instance), and found that 
Smith had also ten coins in his pocket, and that he had also heard the 
words of the president of the company, when the latter was assuring 
Smith “that Jones would in the end be selected” for the job to which 
both men had applied. Then as the story goes, he correctly reaches the 
conclusion that (K).
But what does it mean that Gettier has knowledge that (K) in his 
situation of a meta-knowing agent? Let us pay attention to the fact that 
“all of the following are true”, to use Gettier’s own mode of argumenta-
tion: (iv) (K) is true, (v) Gettier believes that (K) is true, and (vi) Gettier 
is justifi ed in believing that (K) is true.
Thus, as a meta-knowing agent, Gettier comes to know that (K) in 
the way required by the JTB defi nition. But it is namely the claim (K) 
that bears the burden of proving the insuffi ciency of this same defi ni-
tion of knowledge. So, what comes out is that the defi nition is being 
implicitly self-applied. We are facing a situation when a defi nition is 
appropriately used – an act presupposing its adequacy – to show its 
own inadequacy (its own incompleteness).
My new interpretation to the Gettier problem presented so far, does 
not show that the JTB defi nition of knowledge is a complete defi nition. 
It is, regretfully, formally incomplete. What I have, however shown, is 
that from an epistemological point of view this standard defi nition is 
not in need of an amendment, provided the conceptual requirements of 
its three partite structure are properly fulfi lled.
3. Conclusions
The Gettier cases – as well as the fi rst original case suggested by Getti-
er himself, and analyzed here – presuppose a concealed teller of a story 
suggesting a contrived situation, based on the JTB defi nition of knowl-
edge, in which a knowing agent could be deceived that she knows some-
thing, while she does not. However, the very defi nition of knowledge 
that is here under attack lays the requirement that each fabricated sto-
ry be considered within a real cognitive context. To this effect Gettier 
(the teller of the story) must be placed in a position of a meta-knowing 
agent. This is so, because an instrument for analysing knowledge (all 
the more its defi nition), a story no matter how fabricated, has to be of 
a cognitive nature. It was shown that at a meta-knowing level the JTB 
defi nition was kept intact. Thus a specifi c negative answer to the title 
question was reached: the standard (JTB) defi nition of knowledge is not 
epistemologically incomplete, being at the same time formally incom-
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plete. The standard defi nition of knowledge does really work, provided 
the justifi cation at hand is sound and trustworthy. If not, it is not the 
JTB defi nition to be blamed, but the cognitive potential of the knowing 
agent, and the contingent limitations of her interpretative context, so 
that a bad luck could not be evaded.
Having probably an intuition for a similar conclusion, Alvin Plat-
inga once wrote:
After 1963 the justifi ed true belief account of knowledge was seen to be 
defective and lost its exalted status; but even those convinced by Gettier 
that justifi cation (along with truth) isn’t suffi cient for knowledge still mostly 
think it necessary and nearly suffi cient for knowledge: the basic shape or 
contours of the concept of knowledge is given by justifi ed true belief, even 
if a quasi-technical fi llip or addendum (“the fourth condition”) is needed to 
appease Gettier. (Plantinga 1990: 45, his italics)
The here reached conclusion removes the necessity of “quasi-technical 
fi llips” allegedly amending the JTB defi nition, enlarging it with “ad-
denda”. This “defi nitional” line of research, being otherwise stubbornly 
followed, may well be deserted. The Gettier problem is inspired by the 
ancient Meno problem within a contemporary justifi cational discourse. 
Instead of Plato’s ancient metaphorical instruction of “tethering”, or 
“working out the reason” of a merely true belief, the believer should 
care about its adequate justifi cation.
By “adequate justifi cation” I have in mind not the invention of some 
new theory of justifi cation (that is certainly a theoretical ideal, but no 
less certainly a doubtful and problematic aim). I have in mind the spec-
ifi cation of paradigmatic justifi cational contexts (e.g. mundane, juridi-
cal, scientifi c, etc.). For every cognitive situation in each of the para-
digmatic contexts the explication of a relevant set of necessary criteria 
for justifi cation is principally possible, so that the validity of stated 
propositions of interest to be warranted, and not merely guessed.
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